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ARAB NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMANY, 1933–1939: IDEOLOGICAL AND STRATEGIC INCOMPATIBILITY

THE WEIMAR PRECEDENT

When Winston Churchill visited Palestine in March, 1921, the debate over the future of Palestine and the recriminations over the broken promises of the past were at a fever pitch. It had become clear that British control over Palestine would be formalized by a League of Nations Mandate which would then implement the provisions of the Balfour Declaration. In Haifa, a delegation of Muslim and Christian Arabs met with Churchill to express their views on the intensifying conflict in Palestine. Churchill was given a prophetic warning, the accuracy of which has been of profound significance in the recent history of the Middle East:[1]

> Today the Arabs' belief in England is not what it was. . . . If England does not take up the cause of the Arabs, other powers will. From India, Mesopotamia, the Hedjaz and Palestine the cry goes up to England now. If she does not listen, then perhaps Russia will take up their call some day, or perhaps even Germany.

In Palestine and elsewhere in the Middle East, Arab nationalists turned increasingly to Germany during the interwar years for diplomatic and material support in their struggle against the Mandate and its English and Zionist sponsors. This effort was accelerated after Hitler's assumption of power in 1933, as many Arabs mistakenly interpreted the anti-Semitism and the potentially anti-English nationalism of the National Socialist regime as allies in a common struggle.

In spite of her alliance with the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Germany had not lost the basic friendship and goodwill of the Arabs that had existed prior to the war. Germany was generally considered a fellow victim of the post–World War I settlement, and perhaps the only major European power without imperial ambitions in the Middle East. This feeling was expressed late in the summer of 1921 by members of an Arab delegation from Palestine, in London for negotiations with the British government on the future Palestine Mandate. On September 1st, the German Ambassador in London, Dr. Friedrich Stahmer, communicated from London the substance of his talks with the Arab delegation. Stahmer commented on the Arab view of past Arab-German relations as follows:[2]

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They have never had hostile feelings for Germany, having instead trusted Germany more than the other Great Powers because of their impression that, in the pursuit of its interests, Germany has never acted in a purely selfish manner, having instead respected the interests of the indigenous inhabitants.

Stahmer's encounter with the Palestinian Arab delegation in London provided a starting point for a succession of Arab attempts to enlist German sympathy and material support against the British and French presence in the Middle East, and against Zionist efforts to build a National Home in Palestine. These attempts spanned both the Weimar and the National Socialist periods; in each instance, the desired assistance was generally not forthcoming.

The governments of Weimar Germany were approached for help on several occasions, beginning with an attempt by Syrian orthodox Christians in 1921 to involve Germany in Syria in order to dislodge French authority and influence.[3] Another attempt to involve Germany in Syria was made in 1927 when Arab nationalists approached the German Consul-General in Jerusalem with a request for German weapons for use in Syria.[4] The unrest and violence in Palestine in 1929 further intensified Arab pressure on Germany for some measure of support. On these and other occasions, the German government flatly refused material or diplomatic assistance.[5]

The Middle East stood on the periphery of Germany's immediate sphere of national interest, and was not, therefore, crucial in the foreign policy objectives of the German government during the Weimar period. Germany, did have specific political, economic, and cultural interests in that part of the world, however, and pursued specific policies designed to preserve and promote those interests. Germany's considerable economic and cultural interests in the Middle East were deemed best served by an unconditional acceptance of the spirit and intent of the Balfour Declaration, and close relations with and strong support for the Zionist movement in Germany and Palestine.[6] German political interests and aims during the Weimar period were centered primarily on the peaceful revision of the Versailles settlement in Europe, which necessitated a consistent if at times somewhat critical endorsement of the Anglo-French position in the Middle East.[7]

THE ARAB RESPONSE TO THE HITLER REGIME

The new regime in Germany in 1933 generated a high degree of enthusiasm throughout the Arab world, especially in Palestine. Unlike Britain and France, and in spite of repeated refusals to endorse the cause of Arab independence, Germany had not become an object of suspicion and hostility among Arabs during the postwar period. The nationalist fervor of the National Socialist movement and its determination to remove the inequities of the postwar settlement held considerable appeal for Arab leaders who considered the Mandate system and the Balfour Declaration part of the injustice of that settlement. Moreover there was enthusiastic support among some for the anti-Jewish program of the Hitler regime as a result of the developing conflict between Arab and Jewish nationalism in Palestine. Few Arab leaders realized that National Socialist ide-

ology placed the Semitic Arabs at the bottom of its racial hierarchy, and that the Hitler regime had no intention prior to World War II of undermining British authority in the Middle East. Even the realization that Germany was directly responsible for the dramatic increase in Jewish immigration into Palestine after 1933 did little to dampen this enthusiasm.

The positive Arab response to the turn of events in Germany in 1933 was evident by March of that year when the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el-Husseini, met with Heinrich Wolff, the German Consul-General in Jerusalem. The Mufti's views, conveyed to Berlin on the 31st of March, were summarized by Wolff as follows:[8]

> The Mufti made detailed statements to me today to the effect that Muslims inside and outside of Palestine salute the new regime in Germany, and hope for the spread of fascist anti-democratic leadership to other countries.

Wolff again met with the Mufti and other Sheiks from Palestine one month later, at Nebi Musa in the desert mountains near the Dead Sea. After repeated expressions of admiration and sympathy for the new Germany, the Mufti and the assembled Sheiks expressed their approval of the anti-Jewish measures recently undertaken by the Hitler regime.[9]

The realization that Nazi Jewish policy was responsible for the dramatic rise in Jewish immigration into Palestine after 1933 does not seem to have dampened Arab enthusiasm for the new Germany. During his meeting with Consul-General Wolff at Nebi Musa, the Mufti appealed for a German Jewish policy which would direct German Jews away from, not toward, Palestine.[10] In October, 1933, Wolff warned Berlin about indications of Arab resentment toward the German government for its direct contribution to the growing Jewish presence in Palestine.[11] Nevertheless, in his annual report for 1933, Wolff concluded that Adolf Hitler and the new Germany continued to receive a high degree of public enthusiasm and support, in spite of Nazi emigration policies.[12] He further noted that the Arabs were too primitive politically to fully appreciate the fact that Germany and German Jewish policy were greatly intensifying their problem.[13]

According to reports reaching the Foreign Ministry and other Ministries in Berlin, a similar enthusiasm for Germany was evident elsewhere in the Arab world. The German Consulate in Beirut and the German Embassy in Bagdad received letters expressing admiration for Hitler and support for Germany from Syrian and Iraqi citizens, with proposals for cooperation between Germany and the Arab world.[14] The Propaganda Ministry received reports from its sources in the Middle East on pro-German sympathies, with one report concluding:[15]

> In all of the countries of the Middle East I have happily been able to conclude that all of the inhabitants with the exception of the Jews are following events in the new Germany with great sympathy and enthusiasm.

The consensus among German diplomats in the Middle East was that Arab enthusiasm for National Socialist Germany was devoid of a real understanding of the significance of Adolf Hitler and the goals of the National Socialist movement. This prevailing attitude was effectively summarized by Timotheus

Wurst, the German Consul in Jaffa in 1935.[16] Wurst observed that the Arab attitude was conditioned mainly by the anti-Jewish policies of the Hitler regime, while some were impressed by the disciplined, militaristic, and intensely nationalistic posture of the NSDAP. These, Wurst noted, hoped to pursue the aims of Arab nationalism by building a movement based on the National Socialist experience.

THE REJECTION OF ARAB OVERTURES TO 1936

These manifestations of friendship and enthusiasm for the new Germany were followed by determined efforts to secure some measure of German support for the Arab cause in Palestine and elsewhere. Prior to the Arab revolt of 1936, these efforts sought, with rare exception, assistance in two areas, namely German diplomatic support vis-à-vis Great Britain and France, and assistance in the creation of Arab National Socialist parties in the Middle East. In Jerusalem, Consul-General Wolff was the constant target of such initiatives, as was his successor after 1935, Wilhelm Döhle.

Contemptuous of the Arabs as a people, and the aim of Arab independence, Wolff expressed his attitude on Arab initiatives toward Germany in a note to Berlin by quoting an alleged observation by T. E. Lawrence:[17]

> I do not know how one can ever take the Arabs seriously. I know them well. It is not worth the effort.

Early in the summer of 1934, Wolff politely turned down a request by Amir Abdullah of Transjordan for a meeting to discuss Germany's relationship to the Arab national movement.[18] Abdullah was preparing for his forthcoming talks with the British government in London in June, and Wolff did not wish to involve Germany and possibly arouse British suspicions. When Wolff did meet with aides of Abdullah shortly thereafter, he responded to their appeals for German diplomatic support for Arab objectives in Palestine with a firm refusal.[19]

Wolff's actions reflected both his personal views and the official views and policies of his government. On several occasions, both the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellory responded in the same way to Arab overtures. Official German indifference to the Arab cause was evident late in 1934 when Amir Shekib Arslan, an Arab nationalist from Syria and editor of the Geneva-based newspaper *La Nation Arabe*, sought a meeting with Hitler during a visit to Berlin.[20] As a Syrian, Arslan was especially hostile toward France; he wished to exploit Franco-German and Franco-Italian friction and to win both Germany and Italy for the Arab cause. However, he did not get past the Foreign Office, where he was warned that his suggestions were dangerous and unacceptable to Germany. A Foreign Ministry memorandum following the encounter with Arslan and the rejection of his request to see Hitler concluded:[21]

> Germany cannot support the Arabs with money or with arms.

This memorandum was approved in its entirety by the Reich Chancellory three days later.[22]

A Pan-Arab Committee established in Bagdad in the spring of 1933 approached Fritz Grobba, the German Ambassador to Iraq, two years later with proposals for closer ties and cooperation.[23] Representatives of the Committee suggested cooperative efforts in propaganda, as well as German diplomatic support. In response, Grobba gave the standard expression of German sympathy for the aspirations of the Arab people, but rejected any form of direct involvement in or support for the Arab movement. On February 12, 1935, Grobba received the following telegram from Berlin:[24]

Avoid any connection with said group or its representatives. We want nothing to do with these efforts. Exchange of information is out of the question.

A similar situation confronted the German Consulate in Beirut that same year. In a report to Berlin in April, Consul Seiler outlined previous efforts by Syrian nationalists to solicit German support against the French.[25] He also warned that the political climate in Syria was ripe for a new round of anti-French violence, and that French authorities in Syria had become suspicious of German intentions. German popularity in Syria had probably been responsible for French suspicions of German involvement when in reality there was none. Seiler's response to these overtures was the same as Grobba's, as indicated in his April report to Berlin:[26]

We must make every effort to avoid anything which might be construed as taking advantage of the situation by attempting to make common cause with the pan-islamic Nationalists.

After 1933, attempts were made in the Arab world to establish political parties based on Fascist or National Socialist principles and organization. Both Grobba and Wolff were approached in 1933 by individuals with plans to create National Socialist parties in Iraq and Palestine, respectively. The Palestine correspondent of the newspaper *Al Ahram,* Mr. Joseph Francis, represented a group of Palestinian Arabs interested in establishing such a party. Francis wrote to Wolff in April, 1933, requesting assistance from the German Consulate-General in this endeavor.[27] In Bagdad, a similar approach was made to Grobba by Abdul Ghaffur el-Bedri, publisher of the newspaper *Istiqlal,* and a group of supporters.[28] Wolff's adamant opposition to these efforts, expressed in a long report to Berlin in June, 1933, was endorsed by the Foreign Ministry. Wolff was instructed to discourage all contacts between pro-Nazi Arabs and the small Nazi Party organization which was becoming increasingly active among the German-Christian communities in Palestine:[29]

A direct connection between Mr. Francis and members of the *Ortsgruppen* of the NSDAP in Palestine would be regrettable, as German citizens would then be suspected of interfering in the domestic affairs of Palestine.

In June, 1934, Ernst Bohle of the *Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP* informed the German Foreign Ministry that Party membership was to be restricted to German citizens alone, thus effectively barring cooperation between politically motivated Arabs and the Nazi Party organization in Palestine.[30] A year earlier, Bohle had counseled overseas Party cells that National Socialism was not an exportable commodity; he had warned of the dangers of meddling in the inter-

nal politics of host countries, and concluded that the Party was not interested in influencing foreigners in the direction of National Socialism.[31]

THE ARAB REVOLT OF 1936

The outbreak of the Arab revolt in the spring of 1936 was greeted with almost total indifference in Germany. The Press appeared mildly critical of past British policies, but probably no more so than much of the British Press, and certainly with no intention of bestowing moral support on the Arab cause. During the early months of the revolt, reports from the British Embassy in Berlin indicated that the German press had refrained from taking an anti-British, pro-Arab position.[32] It was observed that newspapers in Germany tended to blame the Soviet Union for abetting the unrest in Palestine, and that they generally called on Britain to restore order in the country. The *Völkischer Beobachter*, in an article by Alfred Rosenberg in June, did suggest more sensitivity with regard to Arab demands without betraying the essential aims of the Balfour Declaration.[33]

Nor did the revolt generate much discussion in German government circles. Arab efforts to secure assistance from Germany were intensified, though, with a new emphasis on obtaining German arms. In Bagdad, Fritz Grobba received requests for weapons assistance immediately after the outbreak of violence in Palestine. In December, Grobba was approached by Fauzi Kaoukji, a former Iraqi officer who commanded Arab insurgents in Palestine during the revolt.[34] Kaoukji requested large amounts of German weapons, to be purchased on credit and eventually paid for by Mufti's Higher Committee and by wealthy Arab businessmen. As in the past, Grobba expressed German sympathy for Arab self-determination in Palestine; he also observed that Germany wished to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain, and that German assistance in any form for the Arab cause in Palestine would have a negative impact on Anglo-German relations.

Early in January, 1937, Grobba was visited by members of the Mufti's Higher Committee who hoped to secure German arms and money for future efforts in Palestine.[35] Anticipating the recommendations of the Peel Commission which would be published later that year, the members of the Higher Committee stressed the dangers of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, and concluded that an independent Arab state in Palestine would be Germany's natural ally. Grobba replied that Germany wished above all good relations with Britain, and therefore could not support the Arab revolt against the British Mandate. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry in Berlin concurred with Grobba's position in a telegram to Bagdad on the 5th of January:[36]

> Moreover your point of view, which you have already expressed to Fauzi Kaoukji, is endorsed entirely here. We cannot become involved in the impending conflict.

After a temporary pause in the fighting during the inquiry and deliberations of the Peel Commission beginning in November, 1936, the Arab revolt flared up again when the Commission published its recommendations in July, 1937. This brought about renewed Arab pressure on Germany during the remaining

months of 1937 and into 1938. The Foreign Ministry in Berlin, in response to renewed Arab requests for weapons via the German Consulate in Beirut, responded in October that Germany would not provide weapons or munitions for the Arab cause in Palestine.[37] On the 9th of November, Grobba told Sheik Yussuf Yassin, King Ibn Saud's secretary, that Germany considered it necessary to maintain friendly relations with Britain, and would not, therefore, provide the Palestinian Arabs with the assistance they desired.[38]

THE ZIONIST CONNECTION AND THE PEEL PARTITION PLAN

Between 1933 and 1937, the agencies of the German government and the National Socialist Party actively promoted Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine as a central element in the Jewish policy of the Hitler regime.[39] The responsible authorities in the Foreign Ministry, including the German Consulate-General in Jerusalem, the *Orient-Abteilung, Referat-Deutschland,* and the *Handelspolitische Abteilung,* lent consistent support to the German Zionist movement. The Ministry of the Interior, as the agency responsible for the implementation of emigration policy and procedures, pursued a relatively orderly Zionist emigration from Germany, while the Ministry of Economics and the Reichsbank were chiefly responsible for the Haavara Transfer Agreement and the economics of large-scale Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine. The responsible agencies within the SS police establishment accorded the German Zionist movement preferential treatment over the various non-Zionist and anti-Zionist liberal organizations in the Jewish community. Zionist occupational retraining centers (*Umschulungslager*) were encouraged, while Zionist officials and teachers from Palestine and elsewhere always received entry visas from German authorities to facilitate the efforts of the German Zionist organization.

Economic considerations were also important in German support for Zionist emigration to Palestine. Germany's precarious economic position, as well as Nazi racial philosophy, made it impossible for Jewish emigrants to take even a modest portion of their assets abroad, making it virtually impossible to meet the strict immigration requirements of most destination countries. Moreover the growing international boycott against German goods which followed early anti-Jewish legislation in Germany in 1933 was perceived in Berlin as a major impediment to the economic plans of the new regime. The Haavara Transfer Agreement of August, 1933, partially resolved the problem of removing Jewish assets from Germany by enabling Jewish refugees to transfer a very small portion of those assets to Palestine in the form of German goods; these were sold on the Palestine market, and the incoming refugees were compensated in Palestine. Through Haavara, German exports to Palestine and the rest of the Middle East were substantially increased. At the same time, Haavara helped to neutralize the effectiveness of the anti-German boycott by making Palestine, increasingly a spiritual and national center for world Jewry, a major importer of German goods.[40]

Between 1933 and 1937, Palestine remained a preferred destination in the

emigration schemes of Nazi Jewish policy.[41] The anti-Semitic aims and policies of the Hitler regime created a situation in which both German and Zionist authorities reluctantly recognized certain advantages in pursuing a relatively high degree of cooperation. For the Hitler regime, the Balfour Declaration and subsequent efforts to build a Jewish National Home in Palestine became useful instruments in the pursuit of a 'racially pure' Germany.

Prior to 1937, there was little question as to the wisdom of this policy or concern over its long-term effects. However, the deliberations and recommendations of the Peel Commission generated the first full-scale debate in Berlin in which all elements of Germany's Palestine policy in particular, and Middle East policy in general, were reviewed. The realization that previous policies might contribute to the creation of an independent Jewish state in Palestine revived the old anti-Semitic bogy of an international Jewish conspiracy with Palestine as its base. Doubts were suddenly raised about Germany's past and future relationship with the Zionist movement, and the general thrust of past Nazi emigration policy. There was near unanimous opposition within the government and Party leadership to the creation of an independent Jewish state. Theories of a Jewish conspiracy notwithstanding, the anti-Semitic aims and policies of the Hitler regime would make an independent Jewish state a natural enemy of the Reich, and a dangerous addition to the growing coalition of states hostile toward the new Germany.

The debate generated by the partition plan also raised questions about past attitudes and policies toward Arab national aspirations in Palestine and elsewhere. During the spring and summer of 1937, Ambassador Grobba, Consul Döhle, *Referat-Deutschland* in the Foreign Ministry, and the *Auslandsorganisation* of the NSDAP expressed alarm over the negative impact that support for Zionist emigration to Palestine was having on German prestige among the Arabs.[42] They urged a more sympathetic response, short of material assistance, to Arab overtures of friendship and the general aspirations of Arab nationalism. This is evident in a Foreign Ministry circular on the Palestine problem issued by Foreign Minister von Neurath to German consular missions in London, Jerusalem, and Bagdad on June 1st, 1937.[43] After reaffirming Germany's opposition to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, von Neurath observed:

> There exists a German interest in the strengthening of the Arabs as a counterweight against such a simultaneous growth in the power of the Jews.

He concluded, however, that direct, active involvement in the conflict in Palestine would not be in Germany's interest.

In the end, very little changed. The partition scheme died, and with it for the time being the threat of an independent Jewish state. Within Germany, Hitler actively intervened in the debate over Palestine in 1937 and early in 1938. He insisted on the stepped-up promotion of Jewish emigration and deportation by all possible means, regardless of destination.[44] According to Hitler, Palestine was to continue as a prime destination for German Jewish refugees, and became an even more significant factor in Nazi emigration policies in 1938 and 1939 as the Gestapo and the *Sicherheitsdienst* collaborated with underground

Zionist organizations in the "illegal" immigration of Jewish refugees past the British blockade into Palestine.[45] For the most part, the Hitler regime continued to ignore the Arab factor in its policies toward Palestine and the Middle East.

THE ROLE OF ENGLAND

From the early 1920s until the outbreak of World War II, some form of Anglo-German understanding was a key element in Hitler's overall geopolitical calculations and a major aim in National Socialist foreign policy.[46] Until 1937, Hitler sought an active alliance with Great Britain whereby Germany would guarantee the interests and security of the British Empire around the world in return for British endorsement of German expansion in central and eastern Europe. Demands for the return of some of Germany's former African colonies were not vigorously pursued, while the creation of a large surface navy was waived in favor of the three-to-one disadvantage for Germany agreed to in the Anglo-German Naval Pact of June, 1935. Although Hitler did begin in 1935 and 1936 to press Britain for the return of at least one African colony as a source of desperately needed raw materials, it is clear that he was prepared for the time being to renounce the *Weltpolitik* of the Wilhelmine era in order to secure British friendship and cooperation.

The relative worth attached by Hitler to England and Italy as allies is another indication of the importance to him of an understanding with England. In both *Mein Kampf* and his *Secret Book,* Hitler considers both the natural allies of Germany, and along with Germany, the natural enemies of France. He reasoned that the Mediterranean was Italy's natural sphere of influence and expansion, maintaining that while Italian-French rivalry in the area was beneficial to Germany, Anglo-Italian friction was to be avoided at all costs.[47] Hitler made it clear that he would not support Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean and Africa if they were in conflict with the interests of the British Empire.[48]

Hitler's efforts between 1933 and 1936 to reach an understanding with Britain were not matched by similar efforts toward Italy. Although Anglo-Italian conflicts in the Mediterranean and Africa during the 1930's posed a dilemma for Hitler, the evidence suggests that he would have opted for England had the British government been more receptive to his alliance overtures.[49]

Even before 1937, Hitler began to alter the basic strategy of his *Englandpolitik* without, however, giving up the ultimate goal of an Anglo-German alliance. British rejection of his alliance overtures between 1933 and 1936, coupled with the evident anti-German sentiment in British public opinion, the British press and in the British government, began to have an impact on Hitler by the end of 1936.[50] This state of affairs was greatly reinforced when Hitler's Ambassador to Great Britain, Joachim von Ribbentrop, reported to Hitler late in 1936 that his efforts to achieve an Anglo-German understanding had failed.[51] Moreover, the evidence indicates that Britain's reluctance to act in the Ethiopian crisis of 1935, the Rhineland occupation in 1936, the Spanish civil war after 1936, as well as in the Austrian and Sudeten crises of 1938 convinced Hitler that he could

achieve his ends in Europe without an Anglo-German alliance.[52] These factors not only pushed a reluctant Hitler into a closer relationship with Italy beginning in 1936, but forced him as well to plan for the conquest of *Lebensraum* in Europe in spite of British attitudes and policy.

Setbacks to his *Englandpolitik* did not induce Hitler to abandon hope for an Anglo-German alliance, a hope which continued to motivate him through 1939. Further alliance overtures were made to Lloyd George in Berlin in September, 1936, and again to Lord Lothian in Berlin in May, 1937.[53] In the same month, Hitler confided to Neurath:[54]

> I try it once, and if it does not succeed, I will try it again; and should I again fail, I shall try it a third time. In this I am determined.

A Foreign Ministry memorandum in December, 1937, referred to past failures to reach an accommodation with Britain, and the subsequent move toward closer ties with Italy. It concluded, however, that the move toward Italy was purely tactical and temporary, and that Germany still counted on reaching an accommodation with Britain in the future.[55]

By the end of 1937, Hitler had resolved to achieve his aims in Europe while a passive England looked on helplessly from the outside. Once German hegemony was firmly established on the continent, and England confronted with a fait accompli, the British government would be forced into an alliance with Germany.[56] In the meantime, he did not wish to attack or otherwise undermine the interests and security of the British Empire. Even as late as the summer of 1940, when Hitler had reached the pinnacle of his success and England the depths of despair, he retained his basic support for the integrity and continued existence of the British Empire.[57]

Notwithstanding the strategic advantages of active British support for his plans for *Lebensraum* in Europe, Hitler's strong support for the British Empire and his desire for Anglo-German collaboration were also based on the racial ideology of National Socialism. His motivations with regard to England involved not merely the drive toward German domination of Europe, but an implicit faith in the perpetual domination of the world by white Europeans. Britain's conquest of and control over vast areas of the world were considered by Hitler to be in the strategic and ideological interest of National Socialist Germany. The Anglo-Saxons were part of the Germanic "master race," and Hitler viewed the British Empire as the confirmation of Nazi racial doctrine and living proof of Nordic supremacy. His repeated gestures of friendship and support for the British Empire were based not merely on a quid pro quo approach in order to secure British support for German *Lebensraum;* they must also be considered as gestures of racial solidarity, fully in keeping with the racial foundations of National Socialism.

Hitler's early admiration for the power and size of the British Empire is well documented. As early as April, 1920, in a speech in Munich, Hitler enthusiastically attributed Britain's success overseas to racial superiority over her colonial subjects, and to the British practice of segregating themselves from those subjects.[58] He often referred to British rule in India with unconcealed enthusi-

asm. In *Mein Kampf*, he praised the strength and determination of British imperialism in India, and dismissed the notion that a colonial people might one day throw off the yoke of British rule.[59] He observed that British authority in India could be broken only through the "racial degeneration" of British colonial rulers or by the sword of a powerful European enemy. He concluded with the following racial justification for the existence of the British Empire and for Anglo-German collaboration:[60]

> It is simply an impossibility for a coalition of cripples to storm a powerful state determined, if need be, to risk the last drop of blood for its existence. As a folkish man, who estimates the value of humanity on racial bases, I may not, simply because of my knowledge of their racial inferiority, link my own nation's fate with that of these so-called "oppressed nations".

Alfred Rosenberg, chief racial theoretician and ideologue of National Socialism, was also concerned with the question of European racial solidarity in the face of what he cited as growing Asian and African independence movements, and with the need for joint European resistance to these movements.[61] Ribbentrop persistently stressed the theme of Anglo-German racial ties as the cornerstone for the alliance he was seeking during his term as Ambassador to Britain.[62] Finally, in a public speech before a Nazi student rally in Munich in January, 1936, Hitler called for the perpetual domination of the world by the white race, and spoke of his "natural conviction that the white race has been ordained to rule, to lead and to dominate the rest of the world."[63]

Hitler's *Englandpolitik* during the 1930s was the most important factor which influenced the attitudes and policies of Nazi Germany toward Arab nationalism and its aspirations in Palestine and the rest of the Middle East. For reasons of geopolitical strategy and racial ideology, Hitler was not prepared to support the Arab cause in Palestine and elsewhere. To do so would have alienated England and undermined his efforts to secure an Anglo-German alliance; at the same time, National Socialist racial doctrine would have been violated.

GERMAN ARMS EXPORT POLICY

The source of weapons used by Arab insurgents during the upheavals in Palestine between 1936 and 1939 remains unclear to this day. British Foreign Office and German Foreign Ministry records indicate that both London and Berlin suspected financial and arms assistance for the Palestinian Arabs from such diverse sources as neighboring Arab states, the Soviet Union, and Italy.[64] These records also indicate that German money and arms did not fuel the Arab revolt in Palestine or the overall aims of Arab nationalism elsewhere in the Middle East. Neurath's proposal of June 1st, 1937, for a more sympathetic attitude on Germany's part toward the Arab position in Palestine, had been intended as a means of combatting the partition plan and the recommendation for an independent Jewish state. The failure of the partition scheme and Hitler's desire to continue the emigration process of German Jews to Palestine eliminated the need for an adjustment of German attitudes toward the Arab cause. There was never

any intention of providing material assistance to the Arab revolt, or anything beyond the brief anti-Peel Plan propaganda campaign in the German press in the summer and autumn of 1937. This was hardly an endorsement of Arab independence and an end to the Anglo-French Mandates in the Middle East.

German law prohibited the import and export of weapons until the enactment of the *Gesetz über Aus- und Einfuhr von Kriegsgerät* (Law Regarding the Export and Import of Arms) on November 6th, 1935, which legalized and regulated the export of weapons of war.[65] The law specifically assigned responsibility for arms exports to the *Reichskommissar für Aus- und Einfuhrbewilligung* (Reich Commissioner for Export and Import Authority) and the *Reichskriegsminister* (Reich Minister for War), and contained provisions for the punishment of individuals attempting to sell weapons abroad outside of the established channels. A consortium of German corporations was formed to cooperate with the government in the sale of German weapons abroad. The consortium, known as the *Reichsgruppe Industrie-Ausfuhrgemeinschaft für Kriegsgerät*, consisted of some of Germany's leading arms manufacturers, and reflected the government's overall desire to increase German exports and thereby earn much needed foreign exchange through the sale of German arms.[66]

The statistics of the *Handelspolitische Abteilung* in the German Foreign Ministry reveal a relatively modest export of German war materials to the Arab states of the Middle East between 1936 and 1939.[67] Since the major goal of German weapons export policy was to earn foreign currency with which to purchase foreign food and raw materials, the government demanded in most cases full payment in foreign currency or in needed raw materials.[68] It was only in rare instances that long-term credit was extended for the purchase of German arms. As a result, the great bulk of German arms exports went to the nations of Europe and South America, whereas only a small percentage of total weapons exports went to the Middle East. Moreover the export of arms to areas outside of Europe and South America was restricted by the realities of European colonial rule in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, which precluded free access to existing and potential arms markets in those areas.

Afghanistan and Iran were the two countries of the Middle East in which Germany most actively sought to further her political as well as her economic influence. British power and influence in both countries was not as strong as in the states and territories of the Arab world; as a result, German aims were less likely to encounter British opposition. In October, 1936, Hitler ordered the promotion of close economic ties between Germany and both Afghanistan and Iran, and by 1939, German political and economic influence in both countries was considerable.[69] Rosenberg's *Aussenpolitisches Amt* (Foreign Policy Office) in the NSDAP, in spite of the reservations of Ambassador Grobba and the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, initiated a program in which Germany undertook to train and equip the army and police forces of Afghanistan.[70] Between 1936 and 1939, both states purchased sizeable amounts of weapons from Germany.[71]

Germany also demonstrated an interest in Iraq as a market for arms exports between 1936 and 1939. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 maintained a high degree of Iraqi political and military dependence on Great Britain, in spite of the

nominal independence granted to Iraq.[72] Included in the treaty was the understanding that Iraq would purchase its military hardware from Britain, and look to other sources only when Britain was unable to provide that which Iraq required.

The coup of October, 1936, brought to power a new government which sought to reduce Iraq's political and military dependence on England, and to establish closer ties with Germany.[73] In March, 1937, Grobba notified Berlin that the new Iraqi government had received permission from Britain to look elsewhere to satisfy some of its weapons requirements.[74] The Iraqi government was interested in artillery, anti-aircraft pieces, machine guns, trucks, and fighter aircraft from Germany.[75] In April, the German War Ministry notified the German Foreign Ministry that most of the weapons requested by Iraq could not be delivered because of cost and production problems, and because of Germany's own rearmament needs.[76] Moreover, Ambassador Grobba and the German Foreign Ministry expressed alarm over the proposed arms deal with Iraq due to rising British opposition in May and June, 1937.[77] According to Grobba, British reservations were based on Iraq's role in the Palestine conflict, as Iraq had become the most vociferous critic of the Peel partition plan, and had vowed to use its resources to prevent its implementation.[78] Britain did not appear to fear German political influence in the area.

The consortium of German firms formed in 1937 under the leadership of Rheinmetall-Borsig to negotiate with the Iraqi government was able to sign the first German-Iraqi weapons agreement on the 9th of December, 1937. It amounted to considerably less than that which Iraq had previously requested, and did not encounter British objections. Representatives of Rheinmetall-Borsig had visited London in October, and had secured British permission for the transaction, as well as for future German arms sales to the Middle East.[79] Representatives of the consortium told British officials that the German government, especially the Ministry of War, preferred to work with Britain rather than against her in the matter of arms sales in the Middle East. While British authorities did express their reservations about German arms sales to Iraq, they agreed to permit the purchase by the Iraqi government of some German weapons that Britain herself was unable to supply.

Germany concluded two further arms transactions with Iraq before the outbreak of World War II. In September, 1938, Iraq purchased a small quantity of machine guns with ammunition, and in April, 1939, 18 anti-aircraft pieces with ammunition.[80] These agreements were approved by the British government, but amounted to considerably less than those concluded with Iran and Afghanistan.

Events in Europe in the summer and autumn of 1938, coupled with Hitler's frustration and disillusionment over the failure of his *Englandpolitik*, led to a very brief, half-hearted, and totally inadequate attempt to take advantage of Britain's difficulties in Palestine for the purpose of achieving German aims in central Europe. There is ample evidence that Hitler decided to apply pressure on Britain during the Czechoslovakian crisis by contributing to British problems in Palestine. At a secret conference in mid-July, 1938, attended by Göring,

Keitel, Goebbels, Himmler, and others, Hitler talked of the desirability of having the planned attack on Czechoslovakia coincide with any period of heightened conflict in Palestine.[81] The evidence also indicates that the German *Abwehr* (Intelligence Service), probably on Hitler's orders and in cooperation with Ambassador Grobba in Bagdad, was prepared to abet the conflict in Palestine to this end. Thus, for a brief period in late 1938, a policy of limited German intervention in the Palestine conflict was undertaken, not to undermine and eliminate the British position in Palestine or to promote the cause of Arab independence, but simply to contribute to pressures which might dissuade Britain from intervening in Hitler's plan to destroy Czechoslovakia. Moreover, some interest in supporting Arab unrest in Syria as a means of distracting France from central Europe was expressed by the SS, although there is no evidence that these suggestions led to German activity in Syria.[82]

In his diary entry for August 29th, 1938, *Abwehr* officer Helmuth Groscurth noted the following after a conversation with Ambassador Grobba:[83]

> Discussion with Ambassador Grobba from Bagdad.
> The Arab movement should be activated immediately.

Admiral Canaris, head of the *Abwehr*, had met with the Mufti earlier in the summer of 1938 while traveling incognito to Lebanon.[84] It is possible that the *Abwehr* began to provide some money to the Mufti at that time. On at least one occasion, Ambassador Grobba met Musa el-Alami, then the Mufti's personal secretary, in Damascus, and turned over to him £ Sterling 800 which Grobba said "was entrusted to me in Berlin for this purpose."[85]

The *Abwehr* also attempted to smuggle a small quantity of weapons into Palestine for Arab insurgents via Saudi Arabia late in 1938. As early as February, 1937, the Saudi government had expressed an interest in purchasing German weapons, both for the Saudi armed forces and for the Arab cause in Palestine.[86] According to Grobba, Ibn-Saud was in contact with the Mufti in 1938 and 1939, and wanted to use Saudi Arabia as a base for smuggling weapons into Palestine.[87] The *Abwehr* prepared two small shipments of arms for Palestine, one to be sent via Saudi Arabia and the other via Iraq. Neither shipment left Germany, however, because it was suddenly decided in Berlin that Fuad Hamza, Assistant Saudi Foreign Minister and the Saudi official involved in the operation, could no longer be trusted to keep the secret from Great Britain.[88]

Both Britain and the United States were aware of Germany's brief and sudden interest and activity in Palestine late in 1938. Britain suspected that some German money was reaching the Mufti, while the United States had became convinced by October, 1938, that German money was involved in the Arab revolt.[89] However, British authorities were convinced that Germany had provided no weapons for the Arab insurgents.[90] Nor is there any evidence that any government or Party agencies in Germany, outside of Grobba, the *Abwehr*, and a few high-ranking Nazis, were aware of these activities until long after the fact, in the spring of 1939.

With the Munich agreement, the end of the Sudeten crisis and the temporary passing of an immediate threat of war, there was a simultaneous termination of

German interest in Palestine. As mentioned above, the *Abwehr* arms shipments for Palestine via Saudi Arabia and Iraq were cancelled and never re-scheduled. Moreover Saudi attempts to obtain German weapons, which had begun in 1937 and which took on added significance in mid-1938 with the plans to transfer some German weapons to Palestine, were rejected late in the autumn of 1938. Ribbentrop and the German Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economics, Ferrostaal A.G., the firm with which the Saudis had been negotiating, and the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW) had all come out against selling arms to Saudi Arabia.[91]

Events in Europe and the Middle East late in the spring of 1939 resulted in what at first appeared to be a change in the German position on selling arms to Saudi Arabia. The most important factor was Hitler's reluctant acceptance by late May of the risk of war with the west over Poland.[92] This conviction was evident in the policy calculations of the German Foreign Ministry as well, where people like Weizsäcker, Ribbentrop, Woermann, and Hentig, who previously opposed German involvement in the Arab world, concluded that war with England might be unavoidable, and that Saudi Arabia was the last Arab territory in which Germany still had a chance to establish her influence.[93] Moreover the British White Paper on Palestine of May, 1939, effectively neutralized the Arab rebellion, and removed the most immediate source of anti-British feeling in the country. With the decline of Arab unrest in Palestine, Germany lost this useful point of British vulnerability in the Middle East, and opportunities for applying pressure on Britain in the Middle East for Nazi ends in Europe were rapidly disappearing.

Saudi Arabia made another attempt to secure German arms in 1939, in spite of the failures of 1937–1938. Sheik Yussuf Yassin al-Hud, Ibn Saud's secretary, returned to Berlin in the middle of May to re-open arms negotiations. He met with a much more receptive Foreign Ministry and on June 8th was received by Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop who gave his assent to al-Hud's request for large quantities of rifles and the construction of a munitions factory in Saudi Arabia.[94] On the 17th of June, Hitler received al-Hud at the Berghof and approved the Saudi purchase of 8,000 rifles with 8 million rounds of ammunition, the construction of a small munitions factory in Saudi Arabia, and future sales of anti-aircraft guns and tanks.[95] Negotiations between al-Hud, the Foreign Ministry, and the OKW on a weapons package and the terms of payment continued until an agreement was reached in July.[96] The package, which included 4,000 rifles, anti-aircraft guns and the munitions factory, was never delivered.

The evidence seems to indicate that Hitler never intended to export arms to Saudi Arabia, hoping instead to pressure Britain with the threat of arms sales to Saudi Arabia during the tense summer months of 1939. Even as the negotiations with al-Hud proceeded, German officials expressed doubts about Saudi reliability in the event of war, and the fear that Saudi Arabia, along with the other Arab states, would side with Britain in the end. These doubts apparently affected Hitler as well. The OKW informed the Foreign Ministry on the 11th day of July that Hitler had decided against the export of German arms to states whose position in any future war between Germany and the west was in

doubt.[97] The OKW memorandum concluded by describing South America, the Baltic states, Norway, and Bulgaria as the only safe areas for German arms exports. The statistics of the *Handelspolitische Abteilung* for German arms exports for the spring and summer of 1939 indicate that the Arab states of the Middle East were virtually excluded from access to German weapons, while Iran and Afghanistan continued to receive generous German arms assistance.[98]

CONCLUSIONS

In his memoirs, Fritz Grobba characterizes Germany's Arab policy during the 1930s as one of wasted opportunities.[99] He observes that Germany failed to utilize Arab hostility toward Britain and France, and friendship for Germany to promote German political and economic influence in the Middle East. He explains German policy by observing that Hitler's racism was directed against Arabs as well as Jews, that Hitler was personally disinterested in the Middle East, and that he did not wish to see British imperial power broken in that part of the world. He concludes that the Hitler regime was unable to support the concept of Arab independence and national self-determination. Because of his racial *Weltanschauung* and his geopolitical strategy, and the significance of first England and then Italy in that strategy, Hitler was not willing to commit Germany to Arab independence.

General Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff between 1938 and 1942, has concurred with Grobba's assessment in his Foreword to a study on German involvement with Arab national movements, prepared for the U.S. Army by two former German officers involved in the Middle East during World War II.[100] Referring to the years before and after 1939, Halder observes:

> German efforts to exploit the Arab nationalist movements against Britain lacked a solid foundation. Occupied by other problems more closely akin to his nature, Hitler expended too little interest on the political and psychological currents prevalent in the Arab world. . . . In the diplomatic, propaganda and military fields, Germany had neglected to prepare the ground for a serious threat to Britain in the area of that country's important land communication route between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. . . . No uniformly thought out plan was developed for the exploitation of the Arab nationalist movements.

According to Halder, Germany was unable to effectively exploit its brief opportunities in the Arab world as a result of the policies pursued during the 1930s.

Until the outbreak of war in September, 1939, Germany's Middle East policy was subordinate to the course of Hitler's relations with England and the question of German expansion in Europe. The brief, half-hearted attempt at involvement in Palestine in 1938 was intended to influence Britain and events in Europe, not to change the status quo in Palestine. German Middle East policy was also subordinate to the needs of domestic Jewish policy and the aims of mass Jewish emigration. Palestine remained a prime destination for Jewish refugees in Nazi emigration policy between 1933 and 1939. Continued warnings from German consular officials in Jerusalem, Bagdad, and Beirut throughout the 1930s that German aims and prestige in the Arab world might be compro-

mised by promotion of Zionist emigration to Palestine were ignored.[101] During his talks with al-Hud in Berlin in June, 1939, Hitler refused to act on al-Hud's criticism of German emigration policies.[102]

For the most part, Germany supported the post-World War I status quo in the Middle East. Hitler accepted both the preeminence of British power in that part of the world, as well as some form of Jewish national home under British authority, both realities embodied in the Mandate system and the Balfour Declaration. He completely accepted the third reality of the postwar Middle East settlement, namely the rejection of Arab national self-determination and independence.

ABBREVIATIONS

AA: Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Ministry)
ADAP: *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945*
AO: Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP (Overseas Organization, NSDAP)
BA: Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (Federal Archives)
DB: Deutsche Botschaft (German Embassy)
DG: Deutsche Gesandtschaft (German Embassy)
DGK: Deutsches General-Konsulat (German Consulate-General)
DK: Deutsches Konsulat (German Consulate)
GStA: Geheimes Staatsarchiv/Berlin
IfZ: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich
IMT: International Military Tribunal
NA: National Archives, Washington, D.C.
PA: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Bonn (Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry)
PRO: Public Record Office, London
Promi: Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (Propaganda Ministry)
RAM: Reichsaussenminister (Reich Foreign Minister)
SD-DF: State Department-Decimal Files, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

NOTES

Author's note. This is a revised version of paper presented at the thirteenth annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association in Salt Lake City, Utah, in November, 1979.

[1] Doreen Ingrams, *Palestine Papers, 1917–1922. Seeds of Conflict* (London, 1972), p. 118.

[2] PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 6-Palästina, Bd.1, DB/London an AA/Berlin, K.Nr. 69, 1.Sept.21.

[3] For an account of German Palestine policy during the Weimar years, see: Francis R. J. Nicosia, "Weimar Germany and the Palestine Question," *Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute*, XXIV, 1979.

[4] Ibid.

[5] See: PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Syrien, Bd.1, Freistaat Bayern, Ministerium des Äussern, an AA/Berlin, Nr.44928, 23.Nov.21; Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Syrien, Bd.1, Aufzeichnung des AA, zu III.T.1478, no date; Geheim-Akten, 1920–1936, Politik 2-Syrien, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, JN 145/27, 24.Jan.27; Pol.Abt.III, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd.3, Aufzeichnung Ziemkes, A.O.6577, 23.Dez.29; Pol.Abt.III, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd.3, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 34/40, 21.Jun.30; Pol.Abt.III, Politik 3-Länder (England) Bd.2, Aufzeichnung des AA, III o 6430, 30.Dez.29; and Pol.Abt.III, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd.3, Aufzeichnung Ziemkes zu III o 2110/30, 9.Mai 30.

[6] Nicosia, "Weimar".

[7] Ibid.

[8] PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr.5, 31.März 33. See also: PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 3/33, 20.März 33.

[9] PA: Abt.IV-Kultur, Minderheiten Nr.14, Bd.1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 24/33, 20.Apr.33.

[10] Ibid.

[11] PA: Botschaft Rom, Pol.3-Palästina, Bd.1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Unr. 2/33, 30.Okt.33. For an analysis of Nazi emigration policy, specifically for the support of Zionist emigration from Germany to Palestine, see: Francis R.J. Nicosia, "Zionism in National Socialist Jewish Policy in Germany, 1933–1939", *Journal of Modern History*, vol.50, No.41, Dec. 1978, pp.1262ff.

[12] PA: Botschaft Rom, Pol.3-Palästina, Bd.1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 3/34, 15.Jan.34.

[13] Wolff was an avid supporter of Zionist efforts in Palestine and worked tirelessly for Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine. He was quite unsympathetic toward Arab nationalism. He opposed the anti-Semitic policies of the Hitler regime, and was dismissed from active service in September, 1935, because his wife was Jewish. See: PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 25/33, 24.Apr.33; Sonderreferat-W, Finanzwesen 16, Bd.1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Expf. 3/33, 15.Jun.33, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Expf. 4/33, 24.Jun.33, and DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Expf. 9/33, 27.Jun.33.

[14] PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.2, Der St.S. in der Reichskanzlei an AA/Berlin, Rk.6878, 2.Aug.34.

[15] PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.2, Promi an AA/Berlin, VII/7074/16.3.34, 10.Apr.34.

[16] PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 26-Palästina, Bd.1, DK/Jaffa an AA/Berlin, J.N. 4043/35, 14.Aug.35.

[17] PA: HaPol Abt., Handakten Clodius-Palästina, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 111/33, 25.März 33.

[18] PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 11, Nr.3, Bd.1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit.55/34, 7.Jun.34.

[19] Ibid.

[20] PA:Pol.Abt.III, Jüdische Angelegenheiten, Jüd.Pol.1, Bd.13, AA/Berlin an DK/Genf, III 0/3856, 26.Okt.33.

[21] PA: Geheim Akten 1920–1936, Syrien-Pol.2, Aufzeichnung Prüfers, III 0 4210, 7.Nov.34.

[22] BA: R43/II-1420, Vermerk, Rk.9952, 10.Nov.34.

[23] PA: Pol.Abt.III, Pol.4-Pan-Arab. Bund, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, III 0 574, 2.Feb.35.

[24] PA: Pol.Abt.III, Pol.4-Pan-Arab. Bund, AA/Berlin an DG/Bagdad, Telegramm Nr. 2, 12.Feb.35.

[25] PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Syrien, Bd.1, DGK/Beirut an AA/Berlin, 1/J.N.978, 12.Apr.35.

[26] Ibid.

[27] PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, Joseph Francis/Jaffa an DGK/Jerusalem, 13.Apr.33.

[28] PA: Referat-D, Po5 NE adh7, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.1130, 10.Aug.33.

[29] PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 74/33, 27.Jun.33; Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, Aufzeichnung der Abt.III, zu III 0 2362, 7.Jul.33; Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, AA/Berlin an DGK/Jerusalem, zu III 0 2362, 31.Jul.33.

The activities of the NSDAP in Palestine were restricted to the German Christian communities alone. Both the Party organization and the German communities in general made every effort to avoid contact with politically-motivated Arabs, as well as any involvement in the intensifying Anglo-Arab-Zionist conflict. This was in keeping with the combined policies Party and government agencies in Berlin. For an account of the National Socialist movement and the German Christian communities in Palestine during the inter-war years, see: Francis R.J. Nicosia, "National Socialism and the Demise of the German Christian Communities in Palestine During the 1930's", *The Canadian Journal of History*, vol.XIV. No.2, 1979.

[30] PA: Inland II A/B, 82-03, AO der NSDAP an AA/Berlin, Nr.82-02 1/6, 1.Jun.34. See also: Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (N.Y., 1970), p.122.

[31] BA: Schumacher File/293, Rundschreiben Nr.53 an sämtliche Auslandsgruppen der NSDAP, 3.Okt.33. See also: PA: Abt.IV-Kultur, Deutschtum im Ausland-Allgemeines, Bd.18, Aufzeichnung des V.L.R. Roediger, IVA-1782, 13.Apr.35; Büro des Chefs der AO, Runderlass AO 6, Strafdrohung gegen die Einmischung Reichsdeutscher in die innere Politik ausländischer Staaten,

5.Okt.37; and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, *Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik 1933–1938* (Frankfurt/Main, 1968), pp.102–103.

[32] PRO: F0371/20020-E3048, British Embassy/Berlin to Foreign Office/London, Telegramme No.127, 27th May, 1936.

[33] *Völkischer Beobachter*, Nr.156, 4.Jun.36.

For British accounts of the press reaction in Germany, see: PRO: F0371/20020-E3327, Phipps/Berlin to Eden/London, 4th June, 1936; and F0371/20028-E6609, Phipps/Berlin to Eden/London, 15th October, 1936.

[34] PA:Pol.Abt.II, Po.3-England, Bd.1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.3121, 17.Dez.36; Botschaft Rom, Pol.3-Palästina, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.1335, 30.Mai 36; and Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd.1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.1671, 30.Jun.36.

[35] PA: Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Pol.VII 116-37, 5.Jan.37.

[36] PA: Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, AA/Berlin an DG/Bagdad, zu Pol.VII 116, Telegramm, 5.Jan.37.

[37] PA: Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 5a-Palästina, Bd.2, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, 22.Sept.37; and Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 5a-Palästina, Bd.2, AA/Berlin an DGK/Beirut, 8.Okt.37.

[38] PA:Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.2633, 9.Nov.37.

[39] See: Nicosia, "Zionism".

[40] See: ADAP: C, I/2, Nr.399; and Werner Feilchenfeld, Dolf Michaelis, Ludwig Pinner, *Haavara Transfer nach Palästina und Einwanderung deutscher Juden 1933–1939* (Tübingen, 1972), pp. 24–26.

[41] See: PA: Referat-D, Po5 NE adh7, Bd.1, Bericht über die Lage der jüdischen Flüchtlinge aus Deutschland in den verschiedenen Ländern, September, 1933; Pol.Abt.III, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd.5, "Das jüdische Nationalheim in Palästina" von Dr. Julius Ruppel, III o 1952-33, Mai 1933; Inland II A/B, 83-21, Bd.1, Aufzeichnung des Ref.D., "Die Entwicklung der Judenfrage in Deutschland und ihre Rückwirkung im Ausland", 83-21, 28.Feb.34; and Inland II A/B, 83-21, Bd.3, Referat Deutschland an das Reichsinnenministerium, zu 83-21, 28/8, 6.Sept.35; and Ernst Marcus, "The German Foreign Office and the Palestine Question in the Period 1933–1939", *Yad Vashem Studies* 2 (1958), pp. 183, 186–187.

[42] See: PA: Büro des Reichsaussenministers-Palästina, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr. Polit. 16/37, "Prüfung der Frage, ob unsere Palästina gegenüber bisher verfolgte Richtlinie beibehalten kann oder ob sie eine Änderung erfahren muss", 22.Mär.37; Inland II A/B, 83-21a, Bd.1a, Aufzeichnung des Referat-Deutschlands vom 9.Jan.37; Inland II A/B,83-21a, Bd.1a, Aufzeichnung des Referat-Deutschlands, zu 83-21a, 25/5, 25.Mai 37, und zu 83-21a, 20/5, 26.Mai 37.

See also: PA: Pol.Abt. II, Politik 3-England, Bd.2, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.799, 8.Apr.37; and ADAP: D, V, Nr.562.

[43] ADAP: D, V, Nr. 561.

[44] See: GStA: Rep. 335/11/481, NG3580 (Office of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes), Aussenhandelsamt der AO der NSDAP an den Leiter der AO im Auswärtigen Amt, Ag. 13/1, 1.Feb.38; PA: Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, Aufzeichnung Weizsäckers an das APA, Pol.VII-92, Jan. 1938; and ADAP: D, V, Nr.579.

[45] See: Ehud Avriel, *Open the Gates* (N.Y., 1975), pp. 28, 42, 71–72, 89, 91; Kurt Jacob Ball-Kaduri, "Die illegale Einwanderung der deutschen Juden in Palästina, 1939–1940", *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte* 4 (1975), pp. 388–389; Heinz Höhne, *Das Orden unter dem Totenkopf: Die Geschichte der SS* (Gütersloh, 1967), pp. 318ff; Jon and David Kimche, *The Secret Roads: The Illegal Migration of a People, 1938–1948* (London, 1954), pp. 18–19, 23ff, 32, 38; Nicosia, "Zionism", pp. 1277–1279; and Leni Yahil, ed., "Selected British Documents on the Illegal Immigration to Palestine, 1939–1940", *Yad Vashem Studies* 10 (1974).

[46] See:Dietrich Aigner, *Das Ringen um England* (München, 1969); Josef Henke, *England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül 1935–1939* (Boppard/Rhein, 1973); Klaus Hildebrand, *Vom Reich zum Weltreich. Hitler, NSDAP und Kolonialfrage, 1919–1945* (München, 1969), and *Foreign Policy of the Third Reich* (Berkeley, 1973); Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung 1940–1941* (Frankfurt/Main, 1965), and "England's Place in Hitler's Plans for World Domination", *Journal of Contemporary History* 9, 1974, pp.5–22; Eberhard Jäckel, *Hitlers Weltanschauung, Entwurf einer Herrschaft* (Tübingen, 1969); Axel Kuhn, *Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm* (Stutt-

gart, 1970); Jochen Thies, *Architekt der Weltherrschaft. Die Endziele Hitlers* (Düsseldorf, 1976); Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Hitlers Kriegsziele", *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 8, 1960, pp.121–133; and Gerhard Weinberg, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany* (Chicago, 1970).

See also: Joachim von Ribbentrop, *Zwischen London und Moskau. Erinnerungen und letzte Aufzeichnungen* (Leoni, 1953); and Alfred Rosenberg, *Das Politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs aus den Jahren 1934–1935 und 1939–1940* (Gottingen, 1956).

[47] Adolf Hitler, *The Secret Book*, trans. Salvator Attanasio (N.Y., 1961), pp.67–68.

[48] Jens Petersen, *Hitler-Mussolini. Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin-Rom 1933–1936* (Tübingen, 1973), p.61.

[49] See: PA: Geheim Akten 1920–1936, Italien-Pol.2, Bd.3, AA/Berlin an DB/Rom, 20.Feb.33; Geheim Akten 1920–1936, Italien-Pol.2, Bd.3, DB/Rom, an AA/Berlin, 6.März 33.

[50] See: Oswald Hauser, *England und das Dritte Reich*, I (Stuttgart, 1972), pp.261–265; NA: T-120/738, Telegramm von Hoesch an den Herrn Reichsaussenminister, Nr.132, 15.Mai 33, 366977-980; BA: R43/II-1433, DB/London an AA/Berlin, A.3234, 12.Sept.34; R43/II-1432a, Thomsen/Reichskanzlei an Lammers/Reichskanzlei, Rk.13146, 16.Nov.33; and R43/II-1434, St.S. und Chef der Reichskanzlei (Lammers) an Ribbentrop, Rk.10455/35, 11.Dez.35.

[51] Henke, pp.56–65, 77–78.

[52] Ibid., pp.40–43. See also: Kuhn, pp.178–181; Ferdinand Siebert, *Italiens Weg in den zweiten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt/Main, 1962), pp.31–36; and Speer, pp.71–72.

[53] Hildebrand, *Weltreich*, pp.494ff.

[54] Ibid., p.518. See also: Henke, pp.38, 71–72.

[55] PA: Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Vertrauliche Berichte 1935–1939, Teil I, Vortragsnotiz, Dez.1937.

The German government enthusiastically supported Anglo-Italian efforts to reach a peaceful accommodation in 1937 and 1938 in the Mediterranean, and reacted positively to the Anglo-Italian treaty of 16th April, 1938. See: PA: Inland II A/B, 83-21A, Bd.1a, Telegramm Nr. 269, AA/Berlin an DB/Rom, 23.Aug.37; ADAP: D, I, Nr.742, and Nr.755.

[56] See: Henke, pp.36, 69–70, 105–107; Hildebrand, *Foreign Policy*, pp.51–53; and Hillgruber, *Strategie*, pp.28–29, 144ff.

[57] Malcolm Muggeridge, ed., *The Ciano Diaries, 1939–1943* (London, 1947), p.265. See also: Hillgruber, *Strategie*, p.151.

[58] Reginald Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner im Jahre 1920", *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 11, 1963, p.297.

[59] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (N.Y., 1941), p.956.

[60] Ibid., p.959.

[61] BA: Schumacher File, 124, "Die kulturelle und politische Mission der vier europäischen Grossmächte", Rede von Alfred Rosenberg, 30.Okt.37.

See also: Gunter Schubert, *Anfänge Nationalsozialistischer Aussenpolitik* (Köln, 1963), pp.132, 222.

[62] Aigner, p.13.

[63] BA: NS/26-60, Rede Hitlers vor dem N.S. Studentenbund in München am 26.Jan.36.

[64] See: PA: Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd.1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 34/36, 12.Jul.36; Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 5-Irak, Bd.1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.2569, 3.Okt.36; Pol.Abt.II, Po.3-England, Bd.1, DB/London an AA/Berlin, A.2539, 22.Jun.36; Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd.1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 26/36, 30.Jun.36; Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd.1, Pol.VII 153/37, 6.Feb.37; Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd.1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 6/37, 17.Feb.37; Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd.1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.3121, 17.Dez.36; PRO: F0371/20021-E4329, Report of the Deputy Inspector-General in Palestine, 8th June 1936; F0371/20022-E4858, Colonial Office Memorandum, 28th July, 1936; and Great Britain, 5 *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), CCCXIII (1936), pp.1310–1395.

This was also related to the author by the late Dr. Fritz Grobba in an interview at his home in Bad Godesberg on 30th June, 1973.

[65] PA: Pol.Abt.I, Handel für Pol.1, Waffenhandel und Waffenherstellung, "Gesetz über Aus- und Einfuhr von Kriegsgerät vom 6.Nov.35", signed by Hitler, Blomberg, Bülow and Schacht, from: *Reichsgesetzblatt*, Teil I, 1935, Nr.126, vom 15.Nov.35.

[66] The *Reichsgruppe-Industrie* included firms such as Electroacustic, Krupp, Siemens, C.G.

Haenel, Mauser-Werke A.G., Rheinmetall-Borsig, Deutsche Waffen- und Munition, Carl Zeiss, Polte, Lignose Sprengstoffe A.G., Stoltzenberg, Ernst Leitz, Zeiss-Jena, Hensoldt u. Söhne, and others.

See: PA:HaPol Abt.-Kriegsgerät, Handel mit Kriegsgerät, Allg., Bd.3, Reichsgruppe-Industrie. Ausfuhrgemeinschaft für Kriegsgerät, Jahresbericht für 1937, Nr.B-4; and Pol.Abt.I-Völkerbund, Abrüst.-Waffenhandel und Waffenherstellung, Aufzeichnung von VLR von Kamphoevener, e.o. Pol.I, 2347g, 10.Mai 37.

[67] PA: Geheim Akten 1920–1936, IIFK.33, Kriegsgerät-Allg., Geheimsachen, "Statistik über K.G. Ausfuhr".

See also: PA: HaPol Abt., Kriegsgerät (Geheim), Handel mit Kriegsgerät, allg., Bde.1-4.

[68] PA: HaPol Abt., Kriegsgerät (Geheim), Handel mit Kriegsgerät, Allg., Bd.3, Bericht der Handelspolitischen Abteilung vom 25.Jan.38; and HaPol Abt., Kriegsgerät (Geheim), Handel mit Kriegsgerät, Allg., Bd.3, Statistik über K.G. Ausfuhr im Jahre 1937.

[69] PA: HaPol Abt., Handakten Wiehl, Afghanistan, Bd.1, Aktenvermerk des Ministerialdirektors Ritter im AA, D549000, 16.Okt.36.

See also: PA: Parteidienststellen-Aussenpolitisches Amt, Allg., Zielsetzung des APA der NSDAP, 18.Dez.1939, and Fortschreitende Zusammenarbeit mit der jetzigen afghanischen Regierung, Anlage (no date); Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Iran, Bd.1, DG/Teheran an AA/Berlin, Nr.A.28, (I.A.2), 22.Jan.38; NA: T-120/747, Entwicklung in Afghanistan seit 1918, 352660-676, 1.Dez.39; Fritz Grobba, *Männer und Mächte im Orient: 25 Jahre diplomatischer Tätigkeit im Orient* (Göttingen, 1967), p.188; and Yair Hirschfeld, "Irans Bedeutung für die deutsche Kriegswirtschaft", *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte* VII, 1978.

[70] See: IMT: Vol.XXV, 007-PS; Grobba, p.188; and Werner-Otto von Hentig, *Mein Leben, Eine Dienstreise* (Göttingen, 1962), p.319.

[71] PA: Geheim Akten 1920–1936, II FK.33: Kriegsgerät-Allg., Geheimsachen, "Statistik über K.G. Ausfuhr".

[72] Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq 1932–1958. A Study in Iraqi Politics* (London, 1960), pp.310–312.

[73] Ibid.

[74] PA: HaPol Abt.-Kriegsgerät, Handel mit Irak (Geheim), Bd.1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr.6, 8.März 37.

[75] PA: HaPol Abt.-Kriegsgerät, Handel mit Irak (Geheim), Bd.1, Friedrich Krupp A.G. an AA/Berlin, Nr.32532/Pba/Va, 8.März 37, and DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.679, 20.März 37.

[76] PA: HaPol Abt.-Kriegsgerät, Handel mit Irak (Geheim), Bd.1, Reichskriegsministerium an AA/Berlin, Pol.I 1973, 3.Apr.37.

[77] See: PA: HaPol Abt.-Kriegsgerät, Handel mit Irak (Geheim), Bd.1, Reichswirtschaftsminister an AA/Berlin, II 301/37g, 29.Mai 37, and Aufzeichnung zur Randnotiz auf dem Bericht des Deutschen Gesandten in Bagdad vom 24.Jul.37, Nr.823, von L.S. von der Damerau-Dambrowski, 29.Jul.37, and DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr.26, 12.Mai 37; and Büro des Chefs der AO, Irak 1937–1941, Bd.92, DG/Bagdad an Chef der AO im AA, EWB/RO, 19.Jun.37.

[78] PA: HaPol Abt.-Kriegsgerät, Handel mit Irak (Geheim), Bd.2, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.1717, 15.Jul.37, and DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.1823, 24.Jul.37.

[79] PRO: F0371/20911-J4567, War Office Memorandum of October, 1937.

[80] PA: HaPol Abt.-Kriegsgerät (Geheim), Handel mit Kriegsgerät, Allg., Bd.3, "Kriegslieferungsverträge" (Geheim), e.o. W746g, 10.Aug.38.

According to this document, the British government gave its approval to the September 1938 transaction.

[81] This information was relayed by General Walther von Brauchitsch to Ian Colvin, a British journalist who spent much time in Germany during the late 1930's, and who had contacts with important personalities in Nazi Germany. Colvin writes that the meeting was held "around the 14th of July". See: Ian Colvin, *Vansittart in Office, An Historical Survey of the Origins of the Second World War Based on the Papers of Sir Robert Vansittart* (London, 1965), p.220.

Mr. H.Fitzgerald Harley, a British subject and member of the British Union of Fascists, went to Germany in October, 1937, and stayed there until mid-July, 1938. On the 22nd of July, 1938, Mr. Harley told the British Embassy in Paris that he had seen the minutes of the July meeting in the office of Dr. Karl Schmidt of the Gestapo, and that it had been decided at the meeting to provide the

Arabs with money in order to provoke agitation against the Jews in Palestine. See: PRO: Fo371/21782-E7642, British Embassy/Paris to FO/London, 22nd July, 1938.

[82] NA: T-175/R588, Aufzeichnung Hagens, G-II/112-18/1, 000629, 3.Mai 38.

[83] Helmuth Groscurth, *Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938–1940*, hrsg. von Helmuth Krausnick und Harold Deutsch unter Mitarbeit von Hildegard von Kotze (Stuttgart, 1970), p.106.

[84] Karl-Heinz Abshagen, *Canaris*, trans. Alan Houghton Broderick (London, 1956), p.208; and Oscar Reile, *Geheime Ostfront, Die Deutsche Abwehr im Osten 1921–1945* (München, 1963), p.174.

[85] Interview with Dr. Fritz Grobba at Bad Godesberg, 30th June, 1973. See also: IfZ: Nürnberg Dokument PS-792.

In was not until the summer of 1939 that the British government began to have strong suspicions about Grobba's activities. See: PRO: Fo371/23238-E5101, Colonial Office Memorandum (Baxter), 14th July, 1939; and Fo371/23191-E5128, Foreign Office minute to the British Embassy in Bagdad, 18th July, 1939.

[86] See: ADAP: D, V, Nr.590; PA: HaPol Abt.-Kriegsgerät, Handel mit Irak (Geheim), Bd.1, DG/Kairo an AA/Berlin, zu Pol.I 106g, 5 Feb.37.

[87] Grobba, p.112.

Anglo-American awareness of Ibn-Saud's intentions is evident in: PRO: Fo371/21878-E4188, Foreign Office Memorandum, July, 1938; and SD-DF: 867N.01/1585 (CF), U.S. Embassy/London to State Dept./Washington, Telegram No.368, 20th March, 1939

[88] ADAP: D, V, Nr.590; and VI, Nr.313, 422.

[89] See:PRO: Fo371/21877-E3137, Report of the High Commissioner for Palestine, May, 1938; Fo371/21887-E4838, Foreign Office Memorandum of 14th December, 1938; Fo371/21871-E7394, Foreign Office Memorandum of December, 1938; and SD-DF: 867N.01/1329, Memorandum of Paul Alling, Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Dept. of State/Washington, 21st October, 1938.

[90] PA: Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, DNB-Bericht Nr.303, Blatt 12, Jerusalem, 3.Nov.38.

[91] See:Grobba, p.105; PA: Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 5a-Palästina, Bd.3, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.2765, 21.Nov.37; Parteidienststellen-Aussenpolitisches Amt, Politische Berichte-Saudisch Arabien, Aktennotiz (Harder) betr. Besprechungen mit al-Hud, 17.März 38; Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd.1, Hentig an Woermann, zu Pol.VII 1263, 6.Sept.38; Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd.1, Hentig an Malletke (APA), no date: Büro des Reichsaussenministers, Irak, Aufzeichnung von Hentig, 24.Feb.39; Parteidienststellen-Aussenpolitisches Amt, Politische Berichte-Saudisch Arabien, Aktennotiz des Amts für Vorderasien, 12.Jun.39; and ADAP: D, V, Nr.590.

[92] ADAP: D, VI, Nr.433.

[93] Ibid., Nr.313, 422.

[94] Ibid., Nr.498.

[95] Ibid., Nr.541.

[96] PA:Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd.1, Aufzeichnung von Hentig, Pol.VII 1163, 4.Jul.39, and Pol.VII 1155, 4.Jul.39; and Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd.1, Woermann an Khalid al-Hud, Pol.VII 1186, 12.Jul.39.

[97] PA: HaPol Abt.-Kriegsgerät, Handel mit Kriegsgerät-Allg., Bd.4, OKW an AA/Berlin, Nr. 6147/39g, 22.Jul.39.

[98] PA:Geheim Akten 1920–1936, II FK.33, Kriegsgerät-Allg., Geheimsachen, "Statistik über K.G. Ausfuhr".

[99] Grobba, pp.317–318.

[100] NA: MS/P-207, *German Use of the Arab Nationalist Movements in World War II*, by General der Flieger a.D. Helmuth Felmy and General der Artillerie a.D. Walter Warlimont, with a Foreword by Generaloberst a.D. Franz Halder, Historical Division Headquarters, United States Army-Europe, Foreign Ministry Studies Branch, (no date).

[101] See: ADAP:D, V, Nr.577; PA: Gesandtschaft Beirut, Paket 63-Palästina und Transjordanien, Bd.2, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.2950, 16.Nov.38; Inland II A/B, 83-26 Polen, Aufzeichnung von Hentig, Pol.VII 1041, 19.Jun.39, and Referat-D (Hinrichs) an Gestapo (Lischka), zu 83-26 19/6, 10.Jul.36.

[102] ADAP: D, VI, Nr.541.